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Ford v. State of Nevada, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 36 (Apr. 27, 2006)1 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—JURY SELECTION 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from jury verdict in criminal trial on grounds that prosecutors impermissibly 
excluded jurors based on race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.2   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Supreme Court affirms trial court’s overruling of Defendant Ford’s Batson objection. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Defendant Ford was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to commit robbery 
and one count of robbery with a deadly weapon.  The prosecution had one key witness in the 
case, the victim of the alleged robbery, and the jury was forced to base its verdict upon this one 
person’s word.  Defendant Ford was African American.  During jury selection, the prosecutor 
used three of his four peremptory challenges to exclude three African-American prospective 
jurors: Juror Wit, Juror And, and Juror Bri.  Defendant Ford raised a Batson objection, arguing 
that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges was discriminatory.   
 The prosecutor explained that he dismissed Juror Wit because she had previously been 
arrested for domestic violence and because the prosecutor thought she would have had difficulty 
deciding the case based on one person’s word.  The prosecutor explained that because domestic 
violence cases often rely on one person’s testimony, and Juror Wit previously experienced a 
dismissal in her case, she would seek evidence beyond the victim’s testimony to convict despite 
her statement that she could remain impartial. 
 The prosecutor explained that he dismissed Juror And because she discussed her 
brother’s arrest and conviction for assault and battery and, despite her statement that she could 
remain impartial, stated that her brother was wrongfully convicted because the witnesses testified 
untruthfully at trial. The prosecutor justified this exclusion because her answers evidenced a 
distrust of the jury system.   
 The prosecutor explained that he dismissed Juror Bri because he had also been arrested 
for domestic violence.  Although he stated that he could remain impartial, he also stated that he 
was treated unfairly and was the victim in the case. The prosecutor justified this exclusion 
because the Juror’s “history” supported an inability to remain impartial.   
 In addition, the prosecutor pointed out that he had not excluded two other African-
American jurors.  Defendant Ford responded that the prosecution permitted other non-African-
American jurors to remain on the panel despite their answers that they or their family members 
had been arrested.  The prosecutor justified his failure to exclude them on the grounds that their 
arrests were for DUIs, situations substantively different than domestic violence arrests.  The 
court overruled Defendant Ford’s Batson objection.   
                                                 
1 By Denise S. Balboni 
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 
Discussion 
  
In ruling on Batson objections, Nevada trial courts must undergo a three-part analysis. 
First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Second, the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the peremptory 
challenge to assert a neutral explanation for the challenge.  Finally, the trial court must then 
decide whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has proved purposeful discrimination.3   
 Under the first step, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine the 
existence of a prima facie showing.4  However, this inquiry is moot when, as here, the state 
proffers reasons for its challenges before the court even has a chance to undergo the inquiry.5 
 Under the second step, the state need only proffer race neutral reasons for its peremptory 
challenges.  The reasons given “need not be persuasive or even plausible.”  The justification 
shall be deemed “neutral” when it is not inherently discriminatory.  Here, the excluded jurors’ 
explanations to the prosecutors of their experiences led the prosecutor to conclude that they had a 
distrust of the jury system and that they would tend to be partial to the Defendant when the 
prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of a single witness.  The district court therefore did 
not err in concluding that the prosecutor’s proffered justifications were “facially neutral.”   
 Under the third and final step, the court is called on to consider the persuasiveness of the 
proffered justifications and determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful 
discrimination.6  Although courts are not to accept “implausible or fantastic” justifications, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the practical difficulty in “ferreting out discrimination” involved 
at this step.7 
 Here, Defendant Ford appeals the trial court’s overruling of his Batson objection on two 
grounds: (1) a comparison of the voir dire responses provided by the excluded jurors with those 
provided by the non-excluded jurors reveals that the proffered race-neutral justifications were 
mere pretext; and (2) a comparison of the questions posed to excluded jurors with those posed to 
non-excluded jurors reveals an intent to discriminate.  Defendant Ford’s arguments both focus on 
the third step of the Batson analysis, along lines similar to those argued in Miller-El v. Dretke, 
the Supreme Court’s most recent enunciation of Batson. 
 With regard to the first argument, when “a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a 
black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, 
that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third 
step.”8  Here, the prosecutor explained his exclusion of Juror And on the grounds that she stated 
that her brother had been treated unfairly in his criminal trial and that the victim spoke 
untruthfully against her brother.  Two other, non-excluded jurors also had family members who 
had been convicted of crimes.  However, the crucial distinction justifying Juror And’s exclusion 
was that both jurors who were not excluded stated that their family members had been treated 
fairly.   
                                                 
3 Kaczmarek v. State, 120 Nev. 314, 332 (2004).  
4 Libby v. State, 113 Nev. 251, 255 (1997). 
5 Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 332. 
6 Kaczmarek, 120 Nev. at 333. 
7 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005). 
8 Miller-El,  545 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 2325. 
Next, the prosecutor explained his exclusion of Juror Bri on grounds that he was 
convicted of domestic violence, a conviction that typically relies on one person’s word against 
another’s, and Juror Bri also stated that he had been treated unfairly.  Two other non-excluded 
jurors had been arrested for DUIs. The prosecutor’s exclusion was justified because DUI arrests 
and convictions are fundamentally different from domestic violence arrests and convictions, and 
each of the two non-excluded jurors stated that they harbored no animosity regarding their arrests 
and felt they were treated fairly.  Finally, the prosecutor justified his exclusion of Juror Wit on 
grounds that she had been previously arrested for domestic violence.  Once again, this juror’s 
exclusion was justified because domestic violence situations typically pit the victim against the 
accused in a he-said-she-said contest, and Defendant Ford’s prosecution relied largely on the 
victim’s testimony.   
With regard to the second argument, the record does not support an allegation that the 
prosecution asked Afircan-American jurors any substantively distinct set of questions.  Rather, 
the prosecution asked all prospective jurors questions based on their previous answers.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Nevada Supreme Court affirms the trial court’s overruling of Defendant Ford’s Batson 
objection.  Defendant Ford failed to prove intentional discrimination against the three excluded 
African-American jurors under Batson’s third inquiry.   
Upon comparison of the voir dire responses provided by excluded and non-excluded 
jurors, Juror And’s, Juror Bri’s, and Juror Wit’s exclusions are justified on racially neutral 
grounds.  The state excluded only those prospective jurors who had been previously arrested or 
who had a family member who had been previously arrested, those who stated that they or their 
family members had been treated unfairly by the system, and/or those that had been arrested for 
domestic violence crimes.   
Upon comparison of the questions asked of potential African-American and non-African-
American jurors, Juror And’s, Juror Bri’s, and Juror Wit’s exclusions are justified because the 
prosecutor did not ask inflammatory questions of them that he did not ask the rest of the panel.  
 
